CVE-2026-102424
balbooa forms
Summary
Joomla Extension - balbooa.com - Unauthenticated path traversal exfiltrates local files through auto-reply attachments in Balbooa Forms < 2.4.3.4 - Balbooa Forms accepts upload-field state as Guest-controlled JSON during public form submission. For every object whose `id` merely looks numeric, the component trusts the supplied `filename`, concatenates it below the configured upload directory, and adds the result to an array of local attachment paths. It does not load the referenced attachment row, verify ownership/session/form/field, require that the ID exists, canonicalize the path, or enforce containment. If the form's normal “auto reply” and “attach uploaded files” options are enabled, the component sends those local paths as email attachments to the address submitted in an email field. A Guest can therefore submit a nonexistent numeric ID plus a traversal filename such as `../../../../configuration.php` and receive any file readable by the Joomla process.
Published 2026-09-29 · first seen here 2026-10-10
Analysis & write-ups
No technical write-up from a research team yet. Contact Zero checks Unit 42, Google/Mandiant, Microsoft, Talos, CrowdStrike, Rapid7, watchTowr and others several times a day, plus NVD and CISA reference links.
Where it shows in your logs
Server or web application · Path traversal (read or write arbitrary files) medium confidence
What to look for
- Requests containing ../, ..%2f, %2e%2e%2f, ..\ or double-encoded variants
- Successful (200) responses to requests for config files, keys or password stores (web.config, /etc/passwd, .env)
- If file write is possible: new files in startup, cron or web folders
- The application's process (w3wp.exe, java, tomcat, node, php-fpm, httpd, python) starting shells or LOLBins (cmd, powershell, sh, bash, curl, wget, certutil)
- New script files in web roots (.jsp, .aspx, .php): a web shell
- Requests to unusual URLs on the application from internet IPs right before any of the above
- Outbound connections from the server to new external IPs
Data sources
Web server and WAF logs · ATT&CK DS0015 Application Log Content
- Sentinel
W3CIISLogAppServiceHTTPLogsAzureDiagnostics (Application Gateway / Front Door WAF)_Im_WebSession- Splunk
Web.Webms:iis:autoaccess_combinedWAF / proxy sourcetypes- CrowdStrike
Falcon Next-Gen SIEM: third-party web / WAF / proxy logs
Process creation · ATT&CK DS0009 Process Creation
- Sentinel
DeviceProcessEventsSecurityEvent (4688)Sysmon Event ID 1_Im_ProcessCreate- Splunk
Endpoint.ProcessesXmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/OperationalWinEventLog:Security (4688)- CrowdStrike
ProcessRollup2SyntheticProcessRollup2
File creation · ATT&CK DS0022 File Creation
- Sentinel
DeviceFileEventsSysmon Event ID 11_Im_FileEvent- Splunk
Endpoint.FilesystemSysmon Event ID 11- CrowdStrike
NewExecutableWrittenNewScriptWritten*FileWritten events
Network connections · ATT&CK DS0029 Network Connection Creation / Network Traffic Flow
- Sentinel
DeviceNetworkEventsCommonSecurityLog (firewall)_Im_NetworkSession- Splunk
Network_Traffic.All_TrafficFirewall sourcetypes (pan:traffic, fortigate_traffic, cisco:asa)- CrowdStrike
NetworkConnectIP4NetworkReceiveAcceptIP4NetworkConnectIP6
A generic baseline worked out from the product type and weakness (CWE-22), not a detection. Check table and field names against your environment. Hunt queries for Sigma, Splunk, Sentinel and CrowdStrike are coming.