CVE-2015-5287

Red Hat Automatic Bug Reporting Tool

score 65Known exploited · added 2026-08-26Public PoC ×1

Summary

Red Hat Automatic Bug Reporting Tool Privilege Escalation Vulnerability

Red Hat Automatic Bug Reporting Tool (ABRT) contains a privilege escalation vulnerability that could allow local users with certain permissions to gain privileges via a symlink attack on a file with a predictable name. The impacted product(s) could be end-of-life (EoL) and/or end-of-service (EoS). Users are advised to discontinue use and/or transition to a supported version.

Published 2026-08-26 · first seen here 2026-10-10

CISA required action (due 2026-09-09): Apply mitigations in accordance with vendor instructions, ensuring compliance with CISA’s BOD 26-04 Prioritizing Security Updates Based on Risk (see URL in Notes) guidance and CISA’s “Forensics Triage Requirements” (see URL in Notes). Follow applicable BOD 26-04 guidance for cloud services or discontinue use of the product if mitigations are unavailable. Stakeholders are responsible for evaluating each asset's internet exposure and ensuring adherence to BOD 26-04 patching guidelines.

Analysis & write-ups

No technical write-up from a research team yet. Contact Zero checks Unit 42, Google/Mandiant, Microsoft, Talos, CrowdStrike, Rapid7, watchTowr and others several times a day, plus NVD and CISA reference links.

Exploit availability

Public exploit code lowers the bar for attackers, so prioritise patching and hunting. These repositories are unverified. Fake PoCs that contain malware are common, so never run them outside an isolated lab.

HORKimhab/CVE-2015-5287 · ★0 · created 2026-08-27

Where it shows in your logs

Endpoint OS (macOS, iOS, Linux, Android) · Local privilege escalation medium confidence

What to look for

SYSTEM or root processes started from a non-admin user's session
Known exploit tool names or unsigned binaries run from user-writable folders (Temp, Downloads, /tmp)
Unexpected root processes or shells started by services
New persistence: launch agents/daemons (macOS), cron jobs or systemd units (Linux)
Outbound connections to rare destinations from system processes

Data sources

Process creation · ATT&CK DS0009 Process Creation

Sentinel: DeviceProcessEventsSecurityEvent (4688)Sysmon Event ID 1_Im_ProcessCreate
Splunk: Endpoint.ProcessesXmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/OperationalWinEventLog:Security (4688)
CrowdStrike: ProcessRollup2SyntheticProcessRollup2

File creation · ATT&CK DS0022 File Creation

Sentinel: DeviceFileEventsSysmon Event ID 11_Im_FileEvent
Splunk: Endpoint.FilesystemSysmon Event ID 11
CrowdStrike: NewExecutableWrittenNewScriptWritten*FileWritten events

Network connections · ATT&CK DS0029 Network Connection Creation / Network Traffic Flow

Sentinel: DeviceNetworkEventsCommonSecurityLog (firewall)_Im_NetworkSession
Splunk: Network_Traffic.All_TrafficFirewall sourcetypes (pan:traffic, fortigate_traffic, cisco:asa)
CrowdStrike: NetworkConnectIP4NetworkReceiveAcceptIP4NetworkConnectIP6

Account and group changes · ATT&CK DS0002 User Account Creation / Modification

Sentinel: SecurityEvent (4720, 4728, 4732, 4756)AuditLogsIdentityDirectoryEvents
Splunk: Change.All_Changes (Account_Management)WinEventLog:Security (4720, 4732)
CrowdStrike: UserAccountCreatedUserAccountAddedToGroup

A generic baseline worked out from the product type and weakness, not a detection. Check table and field names against your environment. Hunt queries for Sigma, Splunk, Sentinel and CrowdStrike are coming.